Troutman Sanders
May 6, 2011
Mortgage Modification
Locke Lord
March 11, 2010
K+L Gates
July 7, 2009
Paul
Hastings
March 23, 2009
Ballard
Spahr
March 11,
2009
Please see our Hot Topics for more on this subject.
Orrick
March 6,
2009
Please see our Hot Topics for more on this subject.
Morrison
& Foerster
March 6,
2009
Please see our Hot Topics for more on this subject.
Venable
February 20, 2009
This Alert
reviews the announced framework of the Obama Administration’s “Homeowner
Affordability and Stability Plan” (the “Plan”), further details of which will
be announced on March 4, 2009. The Alert nicely boils down the Administration’s
own summary documents (links below) to quickly deliver the keys points as to
eligibility and incentives. The Alert notes that the Plan “is both
aggressive and comprehensive” in its attempt to restore confidence and
stability to the mortgage market with more than $75 billion dedicated to modify
existing mortgage loans and between $50 billion and $900 billion earmarked to
expand Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s portfolios. The Plan has features that
are geared to incentivize (but not compel) borrowers, lenders, holders and servicers to modify
existing mortgage loans and reduce foreclosures. There is no “cram-down”
element in the Plan, which largely exerts influence where it can without
compulsion (ie through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac et al) although that clearly
still lurks in the wings in the form of proposed Congressional legislation.
From the FinancialStability.gov site:
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan Executive Summary
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan Fact Sheet
Helping Homeowners Under the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan: Three Cases
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan Questions and Answers
Please see our Hot Topics for more on this subject.
Cadwalader
December
18, 2008
This Alert
reviews the currently evolving efforts to reduce mortgage payment defaults (and ensuing
foreclosures) through loan modification and/or guarantee programs. The
introduction notes that securitized loans can be tougher to modify than
non-securitized loans given contractual obligations present in securitization servicing
agreements and the divergent interests of junior and senior investors (senior
investors more likely to be happy with foreclosures given where they stand in
the pecking order and junior, ie more exposed, investors more likely to favor
modifications).

